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“Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our 
philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we 
have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or 
village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or centre of these 
sciences, to human nature itself” (Hume, 1984: 43) 
“And for the citation of so many authors, it is the easiest thing in nature. 
Find out one of those books with an alphabetical index, and without any 
further ceremony, remove it verbatim into your own: and though the world 
will not believe you have occasion for such lumber, yet there are fools enough 
to be thus drawn into an opinion of the work; at least, such a flourishing 
train of attendants will give your book a fashionable air, and recommend it 
to sale; for few chapmen will stand to examine it, and compare the 
authorities upon the compter, since they can expect nothing but their labour 
for their pains. But, after all, sir, if I know anything of the matter, you have 
no occasion for any of those things” (Cervantes, 2000: 6) 
 
 
HUMAN BEINGS AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
s there really a science of human beings? This introduction wants 
to address two points. The first aim is to trigger astonishment at 
the difficulty of radically observing a human being, and nothing 
else. Secondly, this idea is connected with the absence of specific objects 
for anthropology, which cannot be social or cultural phenomena. The 
paper will then clarify a set of theoretical principles in order to make 
anthropology the science of human beings.  
 
To Observe a Human Being: is it so Difficult? 
 
Atom, molecule, cell, neuron, social relation, institution, the universe: 
each has its experts. Is it only the human unit that does not have its 
own? Today, much philosophical thought is given over to consideration 
of twigs, dust, objects or nations, without establishing a hierarchy 
between beings. A philosopher can even add an extra level: being 
amazed by the fact that each of these units is there. He can look at them 
as things to which the fact of being is inherent. 
It does not seem to bother researchers to have to follow a distinct 
I 
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molecule with fluorescent markers using a sophisticated microscope in 
order to observe its fluctuations, or to have to follow an institution or 
even a divinity through people’s discourse or actions. But nothing can 
be taken for granted when it comes to the human unit. Between the 
biologist’s cells, the social sciences’ social groups and the physicist’s 
atoms and universe, the “human” unit is written off, has vanished, is 
removed, the victim of voluntary and involuntary oversight.  
In this context, it is not pointless to recall a few of the individual’s 
philosophical characteristics: his indivisible unity, with boundaries that 
enable him to be counted, his separation from other entities, his trans-
temporal identity, as well as his unicity, it is to say his own intrinsic 
singularity, and sometimes a consciousness of his individuality. One 
might say that in order to be an individual, an entity must satisfy 
criteria of separation, identity and unity “at least to some degree, and 
the more it satisfies them, the more it is individuated” (Pradeu, 2008: 
98). Separation, unity and identity might also characterize other entities 
than human beings, but these features are more relevant to human 
beings than they are to an action, an event, role or feeling, whose 
uniqueness and specific boundaries can strongly be questioned. Yet, 
social sciences do not hesitate to study them. A human being would 
seem to have as much, even more unity and singularity than an urban 
district, a landscape, a rule, a law, the religion of a given region, or an 
ethnicity—all entities that have never really been the object of 
methodological, epistemological or theoretical hesitations. Moreover, of 
course, each human being not only has this dimension of differentiation 
with regard to other entities, but he can also be conscious of his unity, 
and capable of thinking this unity as his own, saying that it is himself 
and valorizing it.  I believe that this characteristic reinforces the need to 
approach a human being as a specific unit of research. 
It is as if observing the human unit entails difficulties that one 
would be inclined to avoid, as if it would risk introducing an inequality, 
a new hierarchy between beings. In philosophy and the social sciences 
today, anti-anthropocentric positions are more common than contrary 
views that stress the originality of humans among all of the living 
entities in the universe. 
I should point out that those who focus on neurons or molecules 
observe at the same time what emanates from these, what happens to 
them, and how these happenings are integrated. The same could apply 
to the study of human units, which are constantly confronted with 
movements and messages, those which come out of them and those 
which come to them.  
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There are a wide variety of objections and resistances to 
confronting the human unit as such:  
 
! Its openness to the outside world and its relational 
dimension are posited as foundations of the human being 
himself. This is the commonly held idea, particularly in the 
social sciences, that the human unit is entirely social. But in 
order to know, confirm or refute this, is it not necessary to 
make detailed comparisons between individuals in order to 
analyze what constitutes a unit and determine the part 
played by the social? 
 
! But if it is only a matter of noticing this obvious relational 
openness—as obvious as the act of breathing—we can 
observe it all the more precisely when confronted with an 
individual who is in the process of opening and closing 
himself to all that surrounds him (other humans, other living 
beings, objects, environments). The aim is then to focus on 
the unit itself in its temporality in order to get a good 
understanding of its forms of openness and closure, and of 
the transformation effects in the course of the existence. 
 
! The epistemological argument stressing the irreducibility of 
experience, which cannot be captured by observation and 
concepts that are always a step behind it. This is a good 
reason not to underestimate the methodological difficulty of 
exploring feelings, moods and flows of consciousness, and 
also to accept this limitation, face up to it and find the best 
means of arriving at even partial answers. 
 
! The disgust that humans can inspire, since they are 
responsible for many evils and catastrophes on Earth. But I 
would repeat that this is all the more reason to better 
explore and understand them.  
 
! The obsolescence of the human figure, so omnipresent in the 
history of thought. Against this objection, one could make 
the observation that this figure has been absent since the 
birth and development of the human and social sciences, 
whose classification system has not reserved a place for the 
human-as-unit. 
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! The risk of “pathos”, and that the label “pathetic” could be 
applied to an analysis of human units. There is in fact a 
pathetic risk of saying over and over again in philosophical 
and anthropological propositions that human existence is the 
main problem, that the world was emptied of the presence of 
human beings by philosophies and social sciences, that 
human existence has an inexhaustible dimension, that 
individual singularities should be favored rather than 
structures and systems. And this is all the more true if one 
injects themes of finitude, contingency and solitude. This 
risk is real, but it must be taken, with a certain vigilance, in 
order to shoulder the science of man, as well as that of 
human units. 
 
One can find it insufferable when human beings are presented as the 
centre of the universe, but this is what they are. And does this stand in 
the way of considering what a science of humans would be? Does it 
amount to positing a hierarchy? Is this the right word? In any case, the 
“hierarchy” does not suggest magnificence and sublimity (the human is 
an animal, of course), but it designates an obvious fact that reinforces 
the need for a science of humans. The hierarchy is evoked as an 
observation, not an ideology. The observation is that of the presence of 
humans in practically all spaces worldwide, humans with contacts, 
histories, productions or creations that, according to various 
perspectives and parameters, carry more weight than those created by 
other beings. This is what is often designated by the term 
“Anthropocene”. And who is this “man”?  
An ontological argument can be added. Not without irony, 
Bertrand Russell mentions what he considers an obvious fact posited by 
Aristotle: “Suppose I say ‘there is such a thing as the game of football,’ 
most people would regard the remark as a truism. But if I were to infer 
that football could exist without football players, I should be rightly 
held to be talking nonsense. Similarly, it would be held, there is such a 
thing as parenthood, but only because there are parents; there is such a 
thing as sweetness, but only because there are sweet things; and there is 
redness, but only because there are red things. And this dependence is 
thought to be not reciprocal: the men who play football would still exist 
even if they never played football; things which are usually sweet may 
turn sour; and my face, which is usually red, may turn pale without 
ceasing to be my face” (Russell, 1995: 176). Not to mention the fact 
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that the same people who play football also do other things before, 
during (to an extent) and after.  
From this I could conclude that it is up to the science of man to 
study human beings, whereas it is for other sciences to study collective 
systems like football or parenthood. This science of man attributes a 
lower ontological status to social configurations than to human beings, 
on the basis that it is impossible to discover organizations without 
humans. It considers a social organization to be an indication of the 
presence of humans, instead of the reverse. Essentially, when social 
science looks at a human, it says: he is full of the social, culture, and 
logics of action and relation. And so it speaks of these. But when 
anthropological science sees groups, interactions and conversations, it 
says that all of these are indications of humans. And therefore it asks: 
Who are they? What are they like? From this perspective, and faced 
with an inflation of the notion of existence, I prefer to avoid waste by 
reserving this notion for entities that are not just separate and tangible 
(because this is the case for objects and animals), but that also have an 
idea of their own existence and its end, entities that exist as 
“individuals”, with “an elaborate sense of self” (Damasio, 1999: 13) and 
are also capable of attributing an existence to inanimate and invisible 
entities. 
 
The Human Being as the Core Unit of Anthropological Analysis   
 
Thus, contrary to the atom, the cell, the social relation and the state, the 
human being as a unit is not the subject of any discipline. Within the 
current range of sciences, in order to be interesting, the human must be 
linked with others or split up. Then he is no longer a unitary volume. In 
the social sciences (which include social or cultural anthropology, since 
these explore cultural diversities and social relations), the human is 
examined as something linked, immediately considered in conjunction 
with other units, particularly other humans but also objects, divinities, 
animals or the environment. Split up, he is examined in his 
psychological functioning (for psychologists) or physiological 
functioning (for movement specialists). Cut up differently, he can also 
be grasped as an action, activity, role or state, which are partial 
expressions of the human unit. Immediately viewed in relations with 
other beings, the human unit is then suspended.  
Of course, individuals are sometimes chosen as objects of 
observation in social sciences and also in social anthropology. I am 
thinking about the works of Biehl and Crapanzano for instance. 
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But when one individual is chosen as the unit of research, it is not to 
examine the unit itself, but rather a particular situation, a psychological 
state, a social becoming (for example based on long-term comparisons), 
a society or a culture, that is to say social or cultural phenomena that he 
exemplifies (for a critical stance, see Heiss, 2015: 241-251; Heiss and 
Piette, 2015: 6-9). It is as if the observer could not settle on the human 
unit and had to immediately change scales. 
So there is something of a dual availability: that of the human 
being as a scientific unit and that of the word “anthropology”, which, in 
the classification of the sciences, only exists linked to qualifiers. If one 
believes that the word “anthropology” has etymological relevance in 
confronting this unit, this obviously amounts to a criticism of the 
tradition of social and cultural anthropology, which has never stopped 
examining cultural diversities and social relations. 
Of course, all of these disciplines of the human sciences can be 
viewed as anthropologies, insofar as they are sciences of social, cultural, 
spatial, historical, speaking humans. But only one well-established 
institutional discipline is called anthropology: social and cultural 
anthropology. Either all of the human and social sciences are 
anthropologies (history, geography, sociology, literary studies, 
linguistics, etc.) and in that case there is no reason to reserve the word 
“anthropology” for the study of social and cultural diversities (in the 
lexical logic that I have just indicated, this study could be called 
sociology, ethnology, culturology); or there is something more or 
different in “anthropology”, but this cannot be the social or the cultural, 
since these things are already being examined by other disciplines. 
Furthermore, to assume that anthropology studies human beings 
insofar as they are culturally different means to assume that the other 
“insofars” are not anthropology, and to forget that these other 
disciplines also study diversities and differences. The structural option 
that consists in finding relations of opposition tells us nothing about 
what the subject of anthropology is, about its specificity. One thing that 
appears to be implicitly or explicitly constant in the institutional history 
of anthropology and in its theoretical discussions is the opposition 
between “us” and “them”, between “Westerners” and others. Does it 
really need to be said again? Anthropology is as if imprisoned by this 
opposition, unable to escape it even when criticizing it. Most works in 
cognitive anthropology or phenomenological anthropology cannot 
resist this opposition and the attraction towards cultural differences. 
Thus, what occurred in anthropology, in the human and social 
sciences, was something of a hijacking of the word, and a loss of 
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specific meaning. It is as if the science of man concerned only a part of 
him, the social and/or cultural part. A kind of equating of a part to the 
whole. In this sense, anthropologists do not sufficiently question the 
history and the institutions of ethnology and social or cultural 
anthropology. The concern and subject are still predominantly cultures, 
the separation between cultures and cultural areas. Today this is well 
illustrated by the ontological turn, a turn that is also religious and 
animalist in some of its expressions. It constitutes a discipline’s 
“maximum”, by intensifying culturalism, by reinforcing thought that 
emphasizes differences, that of natives or aboriginals thus grouped into 
a cultural whole (see Wardle and Schaffner, 2016; Piette, 2016). So what 
has changed in academic anthropology over the past century? This is 
the relevant question raised by Keith Hart, whose criticism of cultural 
relativism, restrictive localism and cosmopolitan interpretation of the 
Kantian anthropology are essential in my view (Hart, 2010; 2013). 
Nothing much has changed; there are hardly any new theoretical 
models; method is barely moving.  
Then what could anthropology be? As the reader will have 
understood, the solution I propose is to associate anthropology with the 
study of the human unit, of the “volume” it constitutes, a volume of 
being, insofar as each one is separate. I am convinced that in order to 
firmly establish anthropology as a specific discipline, it is important to 
emphasize the human entity and extricate it not just from cultures and 
societies, but also from actions and experiences, which impose 
themselves upon the observer’s perspective and analysis too quickly, cut 
off from the human individual. Some anthropologists indeed might raise 
the objection that they no longer examine cultures, that these are only a 
pretext to work on action, experience, this activity, that space, this 
social particularity, etc. Much research—I am thinking particularly of 
phenomenological or existential anthropology that is well represented 
in the United States—is in fact marked by these focuses, but ultimately 
lost the human volume, which it seems to lose in favor of its parts (for 
example the body, subjectivity or perception) or which is absorbed into 
the analysis of relations to others or to the world in general, or into an 
emphasis on the researcher’s relationships and experiences. Their 
descriptive objective—with its questionable level of detail—and their 
way of understanding reflect the history of social and cultural 
anthropology, giving precedence to intersubjectivities, interactions, 
language, narratives and cultural models (see Ram and Houston, 2015). 
I recall Blumenberg’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology and its 
“anthropological prohibition”, which sees “man falling, so to speak, 
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outside of any systematic framework, or if you prefer: he passes through 
it” (Blumenberg, 2011: 44). In this context, I believe it is relevant to 
spell the French term “anthropologie existantiale”, with an a after the 
first t, to indicate that it is an anthropology of existants, volumes taken 
in their unity and continuity, without necessarily any dependence on 
the phenomenological tradition or on philosophical existentialism. The 
English language does not enable this insistence. 
Working on units in their separation from one another and 
developing an appropriate lexicon are crucial from a radically 
anthropological perspective. This is not to say that in the course of their 
explorations, anthropologists will not at least partially encounter 
cultures, actions and experiences. Or that they will not make notes on 
individuals in the process of talking, acting, gesturing, experiencing and 
feeling. Therefore, what is targeted and described is a human being in 
time, continuing, trying to be with others. This perspective implies a 
critical examination, more particularly: 
 
! a criticism of ethnographic forms of observation and 
description that revolve around the sharing, homogenization 
and interaction of individuals; 
 
! a criticism of theories of action as opposed to analyses of 
forms of presence, with the aim of considering the “volume of 
being” itself instead of just the action, activity, experience or 
interaction of the volume; 
 
! a criticism of relationism conceived as “all-consuming 
relations”, in order to favor an analysis that mixes both the 
advance and the withdrawal of the relation; 
 
! a criticism of the overly widespread use of “existence” and 
“existent”, in order to instead conceive of the individual as 
the sole existent surrounded by non-existents to which he 
attributes existences (collective beings or divinities, for 
example). 
 
The foundation of the anthropology (of human beings) thus involves 
radically forgetting the them/us, here/there difference and getting 
beyond ethnography and the relationist problem. 
Given that other disciplines have their centre—space, the past, 
society or economics—is the anthropologist supposed to apologize 
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when he posits human beings as his centre, as a reality, and when he 
claims to be able to say true things about them? For the anthropologist, 
the challenge is to learn to consider a human unit relevant. Let us recall 
that one of the rare anthropologists who thinks about and from the 
individual is Nigel Rapport (for instance, Rapport 2003). According to 
my view, an anthropology of human units implies a shift of perspective, 
with concepts that encourage this shift. This is why I am trying to 
establish a lexicon that is not used by any existing discipline, but leaves 
open the possibility of bridges and dialogues (which will be more 
feasible as anthropology gets more clearly defined) with all other 
disciplines: the social sciences, biology, physics, neuroscience, cognitive 
science or psychoanalysis. Knowing that a “principle” is “a fundamental 
truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief 
or behavior or for a chain of reasoning” (Oxford Dictionary of English), I 
propose the following set of terms (volumity-separity-relateity; 
multiteity-continuity; remaindrity-lessereity), which can serve as 
principles for an anthropological science. They cannot be considered 
independently of one another. These principles would not have come to 
me clearly had I not had the experience of being filmed without 
interruption for almost 12 hours by two artists, Catherine Beaugrand 
and Samuel Dématraz. An unedited film of this day, January 19th 2016, 
is available through the following link: www. lesheuresinegales.fr (soon 
online).  To observe and re-observe images of such a film—this work is 
in progress (Piette, 2017) - allow to follow the volume in its different 
moments and situations, while trying not to lose it.  It is not an easy 
exercise. But it helps to understand better the reality of the human 
volume, of its unity and its continuity. In this text, I want only to 
clarify these theoretical principles.  
What would we learn from an anthropological science? This 
question, which I am asked regularly, implies that we will learn nothing 
that we do not already know through literature and ethnography. One 
might answer that it is possible to learn nothing from an ethnographic 
monograph or a social science theory. The same goes for an article on 
particle physics or molecular biology, which cannot speak to an 
anthropologist. 
Working on one human individual, only one—even if I 
recommend establishing comparisons: what is to be done about the 
objection that it is nothing but a single person? Does an observer of 
social life, whose unit of research is a Paris district, or Catholicism in a 
region of Romania, or relations between teachers and students in 
suburban high schools, not also work on only one single unit: a 
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district, a local Catholicism, a hierarchical relationship, etc.? And yet 
this does not expose them to criticism. To build an anthropological 
science, one must bring oneself to consider the relevance of the unit 
“human being” and realize that, in the course of a human day, there are 
several minutes, several actions, several gestures, several forms of 
presence. Like in a given district, religion or hierarchical relationship, 
there are several people, several social relations, several interactions. 
What do I mean?  The human volume is the most important in a 
science of human beings; it is what the anthropologist must not lose, 
must not dilute in the background, in the situation or in the different 




Firstly, let us consider these three principles, which clarify what 
“human unit” designates. The principle of volumity presents the human 
unit as a volume: this individual here, that individual there. The 
meanings of Latin root words can shed light on the characteristics of 
volume. Volumen designates a roll of papyrus forming a book or part of a 
book. Other meanings of volumen are coil, twist or convolution. In Latin, 
the verb volvere indicates a set of actions that could be tracked as 
essential to the movement of a human volume: rolling, unfolding time 
and months, but also being moved in one’s heart, and meditating in 
one’s mind. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the word “volume” 
was initially “a scroll of parchment or papyrus containing written 
matter”. Other meanings were added: all of the notebooks joined by 
binding, or “a single book or a bound collection of printed sheets”; a 
written work; and also the portion of space occupied by a body. A 
volume is also measurable, whether this measurement concerns a mass, 
a sound, air or blood. In connection with these meanings, a volume can 
also indicate an intensity, scope or modality. A human volume is a very 
individuated volume, filled with being, existence, presence according to 
different intensities. 
The volume cannot be pejoratively associated with geometry. The 
word “volume” presents an extraordinary lexical field, ranging from the 
motion and flow of time or thoughts to three-dimensional solids, due to 
its ability to contain. A volume is what moves and contains, as well as 
the “sheets” that are contained.  
I believe that the notion of volume—immediately attributable to 
every unique new cell born of the meeting between a spermatozoid and 
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an oocyte—can make it possible to avoid what was not necessarily 
avoided by the notions of individual and person: being too often 
conceived in terms of construction, categorization, individualization or 
morality. Volume, which has a physical resonance but is no less 
suggestive of contents, would seem to offer a good opportunity to 
directly confront the human entity. The notion of volume can also make 
it possible to avoid the aforementioned pathos, and can foster reflection 
on the ways of working on the human unit. 
Insofar as it contains various visible, invisible, inner and outer 
elements, insofar as it moves around, the volume constitutes a singular 
perceptible unit, beyond his roles and activities, having a set of changes, 
without this empirical unit being called into question, without it ceasing 
to be recognized or experienced as such. Contrary cases are specifically 
connected with problematical or pathological situations. 
As Varela has written: “Unity (the fact of being distinguishable 
from one’s environment and therefore from other unities) is the sole 
condition necessary for the existence of a studied field”. Unity remains 
“a unity… independently of the transformations it may undergo” 
(Varela, 1979: 61-62 ). The volume of being enables us to draw 
attention to the fact that properties, qualities and accidents (which all 
play different roles in the formation of the empirical unit) arise, settle 
and change, but they never completely change this unit.  
The principle of separity designates the separate character of a 
living being or an object. Latin can enlighten us once again. The Latin 
prefix se- means “without”, “apart from”, “on the one hand”. It is found 
in sepono (to put aside) and in seduco (to lead astray, to take aside, hence 
also to seduce). The idea of “without” is of course not insignificant. 
Separating (se-pars), is putting one part aside, without the other parts. 
The idea of separity aims to draw attention to the fact that this human 
volume is separate from others, with clear boundaries that differentiate 
and separate it. 
There are a few famous “stories” of embryology in the history of 
literature. I am thinking of Montaigne, who described a fourteen-year-
old child he had noticed: “Just below his breast he was firmly attached 
to another child with no head and with the spinal canal blocked, though 
the rest of the body was entire: one arm was in fact shorter than the 
other, but that was accidentally broken at birth. They were joined 
facing each other, looking as though a slightly smaller child were trying 
to put his arm round the neck of a slightly bigger one. […] There was 
no sign of a navel in the imperfect child, though all the rest of the belly 
was there: the parts of that imperfect child which were not 
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attached, such as the arms, buttocks, thighs and legs, dangled down 
loosely over the other one, and in length could reach down to his 
knees.” (Montaigne, 2003: 807) 
A few years ago in the United States, a pair of conjoined twins 
turned sixty years old. A very rare event. I dare not imagine what their 
reality must be like, when they each have their own stomach and heart, 
but share an anus and penis. There is another spectacular case that has 
received a lot of attention on American television: the Hansel sisters, 
born on 7 March 1990 in Minnesota. They are bicephalous, with a 
single body containing two hearts and two stomachs, but having only 
two arms, two legs, two breasts, one pelvis and one reproductive 
system. Each of them coordinates one half of the body, something they 
had to learn in their day-to-day activities, which include sports. Some of 
their actions can only be performed with cooperation, while there are 
others they can do separately, like writing or eating. This state of non-
separation was chosen by the parents when the girls were born. One 
can of course observe a system of individuation that enables them to 
have different actions, tastes and feelings, but this happens against a 
backdrop of near non-separation that makes the anthropologist curious 
to conduct detailed observations about such cases. 
Once detected, pregnancies of this kind are usually terminated. As 
if it were normal for human beings to be empirical units that are 
separate from one another. No unit is included in another, or is in 
attached contact with another. When faced with a case of conjoined 
twins, the feeling that one is observing a kind of monstrosity, or at least 
an oddity, reminds us that the common denominator of human beings 
and many other living entities is the separation of bodies. It is the 
condition of existence since their birth: being separate and continuing in 
this way. 
A volume is a separate being. It almost becomes amazing, even 
incomprehensible, that the philosophical and anthropological lexicon 
treats individuals like the eggs and flour of a cake made by the baker. Is 
it not almost trivial to point out separation? Is it not empirically 
obvious? And yet: I recently read the abstract of a bibliographic article 
“that acknowledges the interconnectedness and inseparability of 
humans and other lifeforms” (https://www.academia.edu/19373244/ 
Multispecies_Ethnography). There is indeed this contemporary trend, 
what I would call an ecolo-relationist ideology that never stops 
considering and describing things and beings in terms of links, 
interactions, connections, networks, identification, empathy and 
attachment. This abstract presents itself as a critique of the 
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“humanist epistemology” and “anthropocentrism” of anthropology, 
which I think has never been anthropocentric or connected with a 
humanist epistemology, but has always turned away from the human 
being, focusing instead on cultures and nonhumans. I precise that I am 
not against the observation of other living species in anthropology—it 
can be important (Piette, 2016: 58-64)—but only if the anthropologist 
also focuses on human beings, without absorbing them in relations, 
groups and cultures. While some anthropologists want to decentre the 
human beings, it is all the more astonishing and crucial to notify that a 
focus on them has almost never been done in anthropology and that 
they have always been “hoovered” into other levels and perspectives.  
In some ways, for instance, Tim Ingold’s anthropology is typical 
of a very relationist rooting. In Ingold’s world, there are people, 
organism-persons in fact, but they are not delimited entities. They are 
“nexuses composed of knotted lines whose slack extremities spread in 
every direction while mixing with other lines and other knots” (Ingold, 
2013: 9). These humans do not live inside their bodies, but are in 
“continuous exchange of materials through layers of constantly 
extending and mutating skin” (ibid.: 10). There are not individuals on 
the one hand and an environment external to them on the other, but “an 
indivisible totality” (ibid.: 28) and an uninterrupted relational field. In 
such a painting, we should not search for singular, autonomous 
individuals. They have no place, other than as processes and movements 
“generated within a relational field that cuts across the interface within 
its environment” (Ingold, 1990: 220). "Separate parts" are only useful 
for considering machines, not life. According to Ingold, to understand 
life, it is important to conceive of it not as separate fragments but as 
“the unfolding of a continuous and ever-evolving field of relations” 
(Ingold, 2011: 237). Thus, the relationist painting abandons any 
ontology of the individual. “In organic life, every part unfolds his or her 
relations with every other person”. This recalls Marilyn Strathern’s 
work on Melanesian people, whom she says “contain a generalized 
sociality within” (Ingold, 1990: 222). Being indissociable from relations, 
people are thus represented in their engagement and not their 
disengagement, an active engagement in an environment or an activity 
that enables them to engage in direct, perceptional relations with 
humans and nonhumans. According to Ingold, it is not a matter of 
choosing between an individual and the external reality, but rather of 
painting a fluid space where “there are no well-defined objects or 
entities. There are rather substances that flow, mix and mutate, 
sometimes congealing into more or less ephemeral forms” (Ingold, 
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2013: 86). Again, with Ingold, we have an anthropology, which shifts its 
attention away from individuals as entities that exist in the world and 
deserve to be studied as such. His individuals “dissolve” into relations. 
There are no volumes ! 
 Of course, humans engage in relations, shape relations and are 
shaped by relations, but their existence cannot be reduced to or deduced 
from the set of relations they are part of. Separity needs not imply that 
the volume does not move towards others. It is even the principle of 
separity itself that makes this movement possible. I link this to the 
principle of relateity. I appeal to this new term in order to avoid 
“relation” and its highly-charged meaning (associated with link, 
interaction and connection) but keep the radical appeal to the Latin 
etymology of the word “relation”, with the impact that this root 
meaning has for my argument. In Latin, relatum is the past participle of 
two verbs. It is the first verb that engendered “relation”. But both are 
interesting. Refero, retuli, relatum means to report, to recount, but also to 
bring back, to withdraw, to take something back to its point of 
departure (I find this remarkable), whereas relaxo, relavi, relatum means 
to loosen, to relieve tension, to relax, to give respite (Oxford Latin 
Dictionary). On the one hand, this etymology makes it possible to free 
“relation” from the lexicon of links and draw attention to movement as 
a departure and a return towards the self, and on the other hand it 
enables this movement to be linked to a kind of distance. 
A human being can be presented as a “radiant” presence. The rays 
emanating from each person, projected at someone else without getting 
all the way there, return to their point of departure, as if they could not 
be stretched all the way to the other presence. The separate human 
volume has also the possibility to receive foreign elements. It even does 
it a great deal. Strictly speaking, it does not integrate beings, does not 
annex them or merge with them; I do not dare speak here of bacteria it 
may have encountered, perhaps without this having any effect on the 
volume’s unity. In the form of an emotion, disposition or thought, it 
integrates effects and traces of presences, gestures, words and events. 
But what is also apparent is that it receives and integrates partially and 
obliquely. In a similar vein, I like to recall Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
analogous thoughts in his essay “Experience” (1883). He writes that 
“the soul is not twin-born but the only begotten” (p. 79), “our relations 
to each other are oblique and casual” and that “the dearest events are 
summer-rain, and we the Para coats that shed every drop” (p. 53). 
In light of this focus on volume, relations all the more clearly 
appear to be something incomplete, certainly not a line that links 
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and interconnects. Therefore, from an anthropological perspective 
centreed on the human unit, what needs to be described is not the line 
or the “between”, but rather the moment of departure and arrival, as 
well as the ways in which what is sent and received is issued and 
absorbed. It is important (and difficult) to observe the effects and 
consequences of gestures, words and events on a unit, at one moment 
and at subsequent moments, in the short, medium and long term. In 
order to contribute to an anthropological science, it is necessary for the 
people themselves—those who would agree to do so—to take regular, 
detailed notes. This could consist in taking a specific statement, gesture, 
activity or event, seeing their impact and watching how they are 
absorbed by the volume. They might be immediately forgotten, or get 
buried in the volume, with the possibility that they will later loom up 
and suddenly become an object of thought and rumination, or trigger an 
immediate act, gesture, or a verbal response.  They can also generate a 
longer cycle of thoughts or acts, and lead the volume into a process of 
accumulation with other things, generating a new state, new rhythms 
and new habits. Something arises in a situation, and it can be taken up 
as a detail, integrated as a reference point and then forgotten. It may 
become a direct relevancy and then either get integrated into a 
routinization process or get eliminated. 
This movement originating in the volume I have called “exo-
action”. A few explanations are needed to characterize exo-actions. The 
prefix “exo” clearly indicates that it is a matter of expressions that 
emerge from individuals, and that these actions are forms of their 
presence. Exo-actions refer to actions of individuals. These exo-actions 
are not independent of their carriers since it is they who perform them, 
but their concrete performance is not absolutely determined by the 
characteristics, roles or statuses of these people, and certainly not solely 
by the elements which are relevant in the situation. The exo-actions 
that are expected in the course of an action are not performed without a 
reserve of other possible actions that may or may not leave traces, 
sometimes minute, in a moment of presence.  
Exo-actions can of course change the individual entities, but very 
rarely in a total sense. Individuals usually preserve a feeling of 
continuity and remain recognizable to others. These actions do not 
affect the whole volume of being of the person executing them or the 
person at whom they are directed. They only affect this or that stratum, 
with very diverse, sometimes very minor consequences. One might say 
that these exo-actions are more or less implicatory, generating changes 
that have various impacts—passing or lasting, sudden or 
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gradual—on the continuity of the existence of the individuals 
concerned. Only through detailed observation of a person can one grasp 
this movement of continuity and change. Before they are performed, 
many of these exo-actions—those of the individual engaged in them or 
those of other people in a situation—are not entirely “essential” to his 
existence. Afterwards, certainly nothing would really have been the 
same if these exo-actions had not been what they had been, but the 
differences between before and after would vary widely. 
It seems to me that the notion of exo-action immediately raises 
questions about the degree of “sticking” between the action and the 
volume of the person performing it, the degree of “determination” 
between the act in progress, the volume and its leftovers. I believe all of 
this suggests a proposition that still needs to be verified: the volume is 
in a play of dependence-independence in regard to actions and relations, 
let us say to various exo-actions. On the one hand, its own exo-actions 
or those of others never completely constitute the volume (it is more 
than the sum-total of these). On the other hand, the exo-actions, which 
are always more or less marked by “other things”, can form a gap, even 
a reduced one, from the volume’s characteristics, its ongoing action, its 




The principle of mult-it-eity designates the multifarious dimension of a 
volume. The suffix “-it(y)” refers to the Latin verb eo, ivi, itum, which 
means to go, to walk, to advance, as found in co-eo, co-itum, co-ire which 
means to go together, to join, to reunite and of course in English it 
means coitus. Something is said to be multifarious when it is not simple 
and has “many varied parts and aspects” (Oxford Dictionary of English). 
This relates to the “sheets” of a volume, which can concern feelings, 
thoughts, emotions, social dispositions, but also multiple ways of being 
present according to situations and moments. The French word 
“aller”—stemming from the Latin ambulare, which means to go and to 
come—indicates this dimension of movement and displacement, with a 
tangle of modes. 
 Through this notion of multiteity, I wish to stress the volume’s 
complexity at every moment. The presence of a volume in a situation at 
moment t constitutes an action and a state of mind resulting from a 
dynamic between several elements: an event, a set of previous events, a 
decision at moment t-1, all of which can be traced back to other space-
times; the integration of these into a background built in the course of 
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life, made up of various strata (habits, skills, experiences…); the 
activation of certain strata, and the placing of others on standby; the 
possible relaying of the current act through commitments, promises and 
desires; the perception of external supports, according to different levels 
of attention (from infraperception to vigilance); the experiencing of the 
moment—according to various moods, feelings and emotions—as an 
obligation or constraint, as an expectation, a strategy or a freedom. And 
also, leftovers, details, in the form of nearly infinite gestures and words. 
It is the intermixing of these elements in simultaneity and succession 
that gives a presence its specificity. Harmony between these elements 
gives the act its facility and the presence its tranquility; disharmony 
creates hesitations, difficulties and tension. 
When looking at a volume, one can be amazed by the facility of its 
acts. The volume stands up in order to get an object, with a view to a 
certain other action, followed by yet another. The performance of each 
action is thus an almost obvious succession of gestures with a 
knowledge—just as obvious—of the surroundings. The volume 
assembles a stock of successive actions capable of being deployed almost 
automatically. Would I say that the volume is caught in a basic 
“actionity”? Carrying out an activity or performing a gesture would 
seem to fit within a series of actions that are as if already proposed, 
appointed and placed before the volume, including when it is adapting 
to a disparity or surprise. In that case, a distance arises that other acts 
will attempt to reduce, by quickly relinearizing the course of the action 
or by creating another course that will be momentary—but a new 
course can also endure in the face of situations and events of another 
scale. In so doing, the volume holds together; it is also a presence with 
ways of being. They would have to be measured by an existential 
barometer, according to a few parameters, on the model of Hoffmann’s 
“spiritual barometer”, used to note the different temperatures and 
atmospheres of his “soul” (Baudelaire, 1995: 31). 
In previous research (Piette, 2015), I presented the reposity chart 
(below), which I will henceforth call the multiteity chart. Its goal is to 
offer criteria with a view to observing the interweaving of various 
“layers” in a volume, particularly forms of presence, engagement and 
disengagement in actions. The notion of reposity is central to my 
analysis. On the one hand, this consists in the ability of human beings to 
sit and repose upon supports. Some of these belong to individuals (their 
skills, experiences and reasons for acting), others come from the 
situation, and may be present before their arrival. On the other hand, it 
consists in the ability to establish new supports against a backdrop 
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of older ones. It is on the basis of these supports and the possibility of 
setting oneself down on them that human beings develop an ability to 
repose in the form of trust, relaxation or a certain passivity. In French, 
the word “reposité” fits well to designate the dual act of “se (re)poser”, 
of “poser” and of “poser à nouveau (re-poser)”. Reposity directly implies 
an economical way of being present in perception and thought.  
 Let me be more precise. I would say that there are four types of 
support and four types of repose. On the one hand, the supports 
primarily make it possible to define the action. On the other hand, the 
modes of repose make it possible to define the corresponding modes of 
presence. At the various points below, certain social science theories 
and conceptual relations can be recognized.  
 A situation is initially organized on the basis of a framework of 
interweaving norms, values and rules. These elements are often obvious 
and go without saying. The individuals do not set the rules of the round 
to be played in each situation. The situation is connected to 
organizational principles that are external to it, immediately arranging 
and structuring actions that quickly become habitual and regular. These 
lead to reciprocal expectations between individuals, enabling each of 
them to predict the behavior of the others and to behave in such a way 
that they do not depart from what others are expecting (for instance, 
Goffman, 1974). These supports do not necessarily impose a 
constraining or determining link upon the action. Between rules and 
actions there is a kind of immediate co-presence. In the succession of 
moments and situations, norms and rules are always there. But some 
can disappear while others are created or transformed. In this case, 
reposity can also mean the ability to install supports, and to install them 
again.  
 A second type of support is made up of elements that are 
immanent in the situation. They are objects or beings that constitute 
direct resources for action, or information that quite naturally entails 
various action consequences. In a situation, objects are supposed to 
organize space, informing its configuration as well as the immediate 
action to be performed; they are supposed to be directly manipulated 
and provoke a specific gesture. Even for seemingly complex activities, 
the flow of the action is thus simplified, reduced to well-coordinated 
manipulations and opportune glances. In a situation, people constitute 
not just a material resource but also an affective one, providing a 
combination of information, assistance, control or simply presence. In 
this way, they too are able to reduce the effort required for engagement, 
thought and deliberation. Conversely, for someone who is 
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discovering the unfamiliarity of a new situation, automatic gestures are 
replaced by the interpretation of instructions and guidance, followed by 
a set of trials and errors, until the actions eventually become routinized. 
In this way, the supports can disappear, reappear and be modified.  
 Networking or interconnection is the third support. 
Independently of the pace of sequential linking, a situation is also part 
of a network that connects it with other situations, according to more 
or less closely woven links contributing to its stability. In each 
configuration, traces and signs make this interconnection of situations 
visible and constitute an additional support without which the 
unfolding of the sequences of action would remain an impossible 
conquest. In this networking, there is the network of situations and at 
the same time the continuity of the elements, signs, objects and people 
that are present in it, incorporated into a past, practices, and decisions 
that have given them expression and stability. This point has been 
developed in the actor-network theory. In this case, breaks in the 
network can impact on what is going on in a situation.  
 Finally, there is sequential linking. It is the organization of 
everyday time, of the day punctuated by the hourly conventions and 
reference points that link one situation to the next without hesitation 
over the choice of subsequent actions. The paced navigation from one 
spatial configuration to another selects this or that action, in such a way 
that the individual already knows not only the order of most the 
situations making up his day, but also, within any given situation, the 
action sequences to complete. 
 It is on, with, and next to these various supports that a human 
being is present in a situation with four economical modes and their 
opposite.  
 
! Cognitive Economy is the first. This presupposes routines and the 
automatic performance of sequences of actions without the need 
for deliberation and without reference to an instruction. Cognitive 
economy is also connected with the presence of mental patterns 
that enable the particular state of a situation to be assessed, thus 
generating appropriate actions almost automatically. This facility 
reflects the central role of material supports in the form of various 
signs (including writing and language) lightening the work 
involved in social negotiation, suspending—or in any case 
minimizing—the need to negotiate or create a new link. The 
opposites of cognitive economy would therefore be evaluation and 
decryption “work”, thought and emotion in their various 
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forms. Cognitive economy is lacking precisely when a novice is 
discovering a new situation, activity or object. But it is also 
lacking in anyone who brings into play, in a maximal, sometimes 
determined form, their ability to evaluate, judge, scheme and draw 
meaning. 
 
! Docility, the second form, corresponds to the possibility of 
reposing upon existing supports rather than changing them. It 
implies a kind of tranquility while the desire, will or need to 
change, to question (rules, human or material reference points) 
risks generating cognitive, emotional or moral tension. The act of 
changing a situation can bring about if not punishment, at least a 
reproach, in any case the serious need for a justification and the 
risk of disagreement or conflict. The enactor of the change will 
maybe answer to questions that could be asked by evaluators or 
various experts, by invoking a set of reasons and motivations that 
will make his action understandable from a semantic or moral 
perspective.  
 
! Fluidity is the third form. It generates a kind of loosening and a 
certain tolerance of compromises, contradictions and 
inconsistencies. Fluidity also translates into various forms of 
making light of a situation, such as humor or irony. This looseness 
is not the game to be played with its rules, but the “slackening” of 
roles, creating another kind of play, like a machine with loose 
screws. Fluidity also corresponds to the possibility of easily 
shifting from one situation to another and effortlessly traversing 
activities that are sometimes very different, connected as they are 
with regulatory principles that would be incompatible in a 
situation of simultaneity. This shifting is made all the more 
possible insofar as within an activity, elements not relevant to it 
can arise in the form of details that enable it to be interwoven with 
previous or subsequent situations, and insofar as the person's 
aptitude for fluidity is supplemented by a particular ability to stay 
just below the level of consciousness, and also to forget his 
previous presences from one activity to another. Fluidity is 
directly connected to skills already acquired—the accumulated 
know-how that the person uses or effortlessly adapts to the 
situation. It is rigidity and inflexibility that are the opposite of 
fluidity. It is this fluidity that will make it possible to assume 
attitudes of relaxation and distracted attention: not really 
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listening, looking without seeing, talking without speaking, 
forgetting, turning a blind eye, deferring… 
 
! Distraction, the fourth form, corresponds to this cognitive 
specificity to connect a distracting being, object or event with the 
status of a detail and thus avoid compromising the minimal 
attention the situation requires. It is only possible on a foundation 
of both reposity and lightened presence through various supports. 
There are certainly different forms of distraction, such as 
detachment accompanied by an air of absence, or distraction 
provoked by external noise (sunshine or a stain on the wall), but 
distracting elements are only such because they do not constitute 
a sharable engagement model, as we have seen before. Since they 
are only tolerated, they cannot become behavior to imitate. The 
opposite of this light form of distraction is concentration. 
 
This provides me—not just in terms of supports but also in terms of 
forms of repose—with four elements and their respective opposites. On 
the "supports" axis: norms (rules, conventions, etc.) versus rupture or 
change of norms (conflicts); reference points (clues) versus the loss or 
change of reference points; the networking of situations versus the 
rupture of links; pace of time (temporal rhythm) versus the rupture or 
change of rhythm (anxiety, worry...). On the "repose" axis: cognitive 
economy versus decryption (evaluation, judgment); docility versus the 
desire for change; fluidity versus rigidity; distraction versus 
concentration. 
 Supports and repose combine to generate various modes of 
presence. I will isolate four of them. Tranquility often develops from 
infra-perception of reference points and spatiotemporal signs, against a 
quite stable backdrop, sometimes experienced as such, with the 
possibility that unimportant details could emerge. In familiarity, some 
points of reference and signs are new, or at least different, and others 
are found to be lacking relative to previous situations, though the 
difference is still absorbed in the economical mode, against a backdrop 
that is still well-anchored. It is when the at least partial disintegration 
of this backdrop is sensed—with the imposed or created absence of 
certain supports—that strangeness arises and reduces the possibility of 
distractions. There follows an attentive or emotional tension of 
(re)construction, judgment and evaluation. Then it is as if the backdrop 
were withdrawn, giving way to the nearly exclusive focus on an 
element. It appears to me that it is essential to perceive the 
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constant, tangled play of these modes of presence in relation to the 
mobility of supports that either remain, go away or are recreated.  
 These different forms of support and repose, as well as their 
respective opposites, constitute a descriptive framework for 
understanding and representing the movement of the sequences of a 
human presence in successive situations, between repose and work, 
between strangeness and tranquility, between tension and familiarity. 
The forms of repose and work are placed on the following chart, the 
Multiteity Chart: 
 
But what detailed observations reveal in one single situation (Piette 
2015), even in one single moment (depending on the chosen scale) are 
interweaved presences, always with doses of tranquility (Tr), tension 
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(Te), strangeness (St) and familiarity (Fl). The exclusively active form 
of being (which implies busyness, attention, concentration, will, 
intention, significance…) aiming to create new supports is extreme, as 
is the exclusively passive form of being which rests on things that exist 
in the situation. 
The continuity of the moments is thus directly linked to the 
availability, alongside human presence, of practically inexhaustible 
revivifying supports. As I have pointed out, they consist of reference 
points, clues and rules. They are people or objects, spatiotemporal 
indicators in a situation’s foreground and background. But most 
importantly they have the ability to reappear (and be perceived) in other 
forms after they disappear, to mitigate a tragic dominant characteristic, 
to qualify a cognitive, emotional tension, to lighten the work of 
grasping meaning. At the height of conflict, strangeness, anxiety or 
ruptures, people find forms of repose. Even though one or two supports 
are lacking, others remain. When cognitive economy gives way to the 
relentless search for meaning, and docility gives way to instability, and 
fluidity to inflexibility, and distraction to intransigence, strangeness can 
only be either very temporary, in which case it is quickly absorbed, or 
diffuse in which case it is still permeated in different doses by various 
rules, points of reference or clues supporting the situation. But all of 
these difficult events can have various impacts: from simple rumination 
to more or less serious consequences.  
The principle of multiteity has theoretical consequences. It 
consists in an interpretation in terms not of action, but presence. On the 
chart, the strong points of various theoretical interpretations can be 
identified.  They no longer designate action logics but rather forms of 
presence. On the vertical line, at the cognitive economy and docility 
dots, it would be Bourdieu’s theory for example. It makes it possible to 
visualize the reduction (frequent in the social sciences) of the upper 
segment of the vertical line since fluidity and distraction are elements 
that are often eliminated from sociological analyzes. Presence in a 
situation presupposes not so much a “total and unconditional” 
adherence (according to Bourdieu’s vocabulary centreed on Tr 1-3 and 
5-7), but also a way of being fluid, distracted and distant (Tr 9-16). 
Moreover, these analyzes risk confusing modes of presence with their 
supports, which are presented as internalized. According to this type of 
interpretation, there would no longer be any objects or supports, and 
there would therefore no longer be any horizontal line.  
             On the vertical line, there are also theories of action: Weber, 
interactionism and ethnomethodology, as well as pragmatic 
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sociology. The thematic and analytical focus of the two lower squares 
(tension and strangeness), which can particularly be perceived in the 
researches of various sociologies of action, favor themes explicitly 
connected with challenges or interpretations related to work and 
tension in situations that do not necessarily require these. Of course, it 
could be said that such or such theory of social sciences is more accurate 
than others, according to certain moments and situations, or that all 
theories can be right, but each at different moments of an individual’s 
day. Yet, this is only valid if one nuances every time the logic of action, 
which is favored by the theory.  (Piette, 2015: 55-58). Indeed, even in a 
situation of crisis, individuals are less productive of meaning, 
consciousness, rationality, strategies and justifications than is willing to 
be acknowledged by the whole range of sociologies of the subject and 
sociologies of action.  
 On the horizontal line representing supports, there would be the 
actor-network theory. We would see then another asymmetry:  it 
consists in presenting supports as the only working entities and 
attributing cognitive information-storage and information-processing 
operations to objects and the environment, but at the risk of not 
considering human modes of presence. In such a case, the vertical line 
would no longer exist! This is also the risk that the distributed 
cognition theory might focus on cognition as if it were shared in a 
situation by objects and various other resources and might omit the 
presence of people, or in any case reduce them to the only attention and 
coordination activity.   
The multiteity is important, but the continuity also. Stressing the 
multiteity of the volume of presence should not cause one to forget its 
continuity. The principle of continuity concerns that which is 
continuous in the volume, that which is not interrupted. It designates, 
on the one hand, the succession of the volume’s acts and forms of 
presence, and, on the other hand, a constancy of and in the volume. 
Much of the anthropological work focused on this volume consists in 
describing human beings who are concerned by time, intensely 
concerned, because they are the only living beings to know about it and 
be conscious of it in their own way. Observing the volume means 
observing it as a being in time. To consider this volume from birth and 
then from day to day: ideally, this is the exercise that should be 
undertaken by the anthropologist as an observer of existence. Thus 
anthropological science will make special use of the continuous filming 
of existence, but will also ask people to take notes themselves, 
describing their acts, feelings, and explaining how they are 
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affected by what happens. This kind of observation reveals another 
continuity, that of the volume, which changes while staying the same. 
A unique volume of being is initially a single cell, one that is 
unique, at least in terms of its genome. Having resulted from what may 
have started as an embrace, it is immediately more than the sum of the 
two. In utero, it develops and modifies itself from received genetic 
potential and according to the diverse information this volume of being 
integrates from its immediate environment. Before dividing, this unique 
cell lives between twelve and twenty-four hours. Here we have a 
“substance”—inseparable matter and form, one never being without the 
other—according to Aristotelian vocabulary. It is the volume of being. 
This does not rule out incorporating contemporary biological advances, 
which allow the genome itself to be partially and differentially modified 
(depending on the cells) at any point in its existence, according to the 
individual’s own experiences or in a radically random way, and with 
more or less significant impacts. This volume of being will then develop 
physiologically, neurologically, cognitively, emotionally, socially, 
culturally, from its first moments, and will thus continue its develop-
ment, or what we could call its existence, until it dies, integrating 
different relations. 
If we consider the volume’s singularity, various forms appear:  
 
! The singularity of separation. Originating in a single cell, it 
consists of the existence of the numerical unit as separate from 
others, as not being any of the others, as linked to the physical fact 
of not being anything else. The language, continuity of existence 
and memory accentuate this separation, by enabling to represent 
oneself as oneself and to feel like oneself. 
 
! The singularity of combinations. It is linked to the sum of social 
trajectories, relations experienced in the course of existence. The 
infinite combinations of these relations generate a virtually zero 
probability of being reproduced. 
 
! The singularity of details. They cannot be reduced to social 
combinations. They emerge in one situation and are repeated from 
time to time, several times. They can then be recognized as 
characterizing an individual. 
 
! The singularity of continuity. This constitutes a kind of core, 
some parts of which are actualized in a situation, others remaining 
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on stand-by in the succession of moments. Parts of the core go 
through the roles fulfilled by the individual. This core forms in 
and through relations, but also in and with the contingency of 
details. 
 
This is to stress the fact that the volume is not only a multiplicity of 
roles or selves but also, in every part of the world, a “coherence”, a 
“consistency” crossing and permeating these, based on a body, gestures 
and cognitive abilities that become stabilized in the course of existence. 
As the poet expresses well: “everything in Nature grows and defends 
itself in its own way and is characteristically and spontaneously itself, 
seeks at all costs to be so and against all opposition” (Rilke, 1962: 53). 
Thus, at one and the same time, the volume holds itself together and 
something holds it together, and this is of course never fixed, but it 
undergoes only superficial and fragmentary changes at each moment. 
This “something” can be viewed as a kind of “kernel”, as long as this 
does not designate a substantial dimension that would only be 
discovered once the “layers”—i.e. the various roles—have been 
removed, according to Peer Gynt’s famous tirade (Ibsen, 2009), but 
instead refers to identical characteristics that run across these layers 
and roles.  
From this perspective, it is important to view the volume as an 
observation reference point when following its continuous movements, 
revealing its gradual variations, but also to observe elements that 
indicate a style of existence, which can be found from role to role, from 
layer to layer, in gestures, words, or better yet in the modalities of 
performing certain acts, of speaking certain words, in the succession of 
moments and situations. It is as if temporally continuous observation 
also showed continuity in a volume, a continuous singularity. Does it 
need to be pointed out that without ever being totally fixed, some 
“potentialities” that pass through the layers are all the more stable in 
that they were constituted at the beginning of the volume’s existence?  
How does one distinguish between what stays the same and what 
has changed? Today’s black hair will be white in fifty years, or could be 
red in ten minutes after being dyed. An individual that is now kind can 
become wicked a short time later. A person can go from single to 
married. He can change profession. But, in all of these cases, he remains 
tall or short, intelligent or a simpleton, with a way of being kind and 
wicked, a way that more or less belongs to him. He moves to a different 
place, but continues to be this or that, to be like this and like that. Since 
it is not easy to distinguish a medium from its attributes, it is all 
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the more useful to think in terms of a volume of being, a concrete being 
with various characteristics, with its surface and everything it contains. 
And when observing the qualities and acts of a volume of being in 
the process of moving from one place to another, it is also difficult to 
separate out the relevant, the necessary and the accidental. Let us take 
an example from Aristotle: “Example: someone is digging a trench for a 
plant and finds treasure. This finding of the treasure is an accident for 
the man who digs the trench. It is not the case that finding treasure 
necessarily comes from or after digging a trench, nor would one for the 
most part in doing some planting find treasure” (Aristotle, 2004: 
1025a). Because of this accident, this individual became rich, began new 
activities and acquired new characteristics that now defined him. Any 
insignificant gesture can of course have a considerable consequence, and 
this we only know after the fact. But with regard to the singularity of 
the continuing volume, one must not forget that what it integrates in 
the course of moments and situations, even in an unexpected way, 
possibly nuancing its style (with its “potentialities”), will also be at least 
“in-formed” by it. The one who discovers a treasure certainly has his 
own way of finding it, losing it, enjoying it and changing his life after 
becoming rich. And the anthropologist asks: At moment t, how did the 
volume’s potentialities absorb and integrate what happened? With how 
much strength? To what degree? And also: What escapes these various 
potentialities at this same moment t, and what will rebound on them, 
changing them even a little bit? And what will have no impact on these? 
Aristotle wondered, “who, except the philosopher, is going to ask 
whether Socrates risen and Socrates seated is the same thing?” 
(Aristotle, 2004: 1004b).  It is up to the anthropologist to do this. He 
therefore sets about observing the volume with its modalizing and 
modulating aptitudes, pinpointing what changes and what stays the 





The principle of remaindrity concerns “remainders”, that is to say “a 
part, number, or quantity that is left over” (Oxford Dictionary of 
English)—I would say parts that have already been analyzed and 
clarified. Remainders are surplus or, put differently, the element that is 
left after subtraction or division. As for the verb “to remain”, the Oxford 
Dictionary says: “to continue to exist, especially after other similar 
people or things have ceased to do so”, as if remainders, that which is 
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still and always present beyond that which has been removed, were 
always that which continues and also that which keeps the volume 
going.  
What do we observe when an individual is with others in a so-
called collective action? He is there, doing what is necessary, without 
much mental or physical effort, very often out of habit, with economical 
perception, varying according to the situation of course. Most human 
actions develop in a situation without requiring more than this from the 
people who are there: only the minimal integration behavior, I would 
say. It consists of expected actions that often reflect not so much their 
ongoing performance but rather the earlier intention or decision to 
perform them. At the same time, this intention or decision is self-
evident, reflecting prior situations, as we have just seen. Very visible 
externally, the stratum of minimal integration behavior often intrudes 
little upon the immediate presence experienced by the person. These 
minimal behaviors are executed all the more lightly insofar as they are 
routines, linked to known rules or co-present objects and supports. 
But precisely in addition to this stratum, the human presence also 
includes remainders, the volume of remainders. In fact, a close look at 
the minimal integration behavior in a single situation reveals that no 
two behaviors are really alike. There are of course different styles and 
social tendencies surrounding one same gesture, but more importantly, 
in parallel with the execution of the gesture there are remainders that 
are thus characterized because they do not jeopardize the minimum 
integration behavior (Piette, 2015 and 2016). These are gestures 
peripheral to the expected action and thoughts heterogeneous to it. 
They are also personalized, sometimes emotional evocations, stemming 
from what is being done or said, the occasional feeling that an 
experience is unfulfilling, or even an impression of constraint, or a brief 
critical doubt about what is happening. The minimal integration 
behavior is highly visible to everyone, whereas remainders are often 
invisible to other individuals. Expected behaviors can be (though they 
are not always) less present in inner experiences than remainders, 
which are sometimes strongly self-perceived and felt (at least some of 
them) in the course of the action, though not enough to jeopardize the 
successful development of the situation. It means that the internal 
elements of the volume can emerge on the “face” to be saved and on the 
surface of the expected role. 
The principle of lessereity specifies the “remainders” that reduce 
importance, relevance and stakes. These have the effect of diminishing 
the volume in the volume. Not all of the remainders in this volume 
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can be easily distinguished as such. There are also a vagueness and 
incompletion that insert themselves into the presence. In that case, 
lessereity concerns not only secondary layers of presence, but the whole 
presence in the action, of which slight distraction is only one element. 
This could be called minimal presence, indicating why the insertion 
behavior is said to be minimal. It is not knowing, not wanting to know. 
It is being docile even while leading a political revolution. It is not 
drawing conclusions, not imagining the implications of one’s actions, 
not accepting and even killing, suffering and continuing. One could say 
this is the everyday way of being, not only penetrated by things other 
than those that the situation concerns, but also consisting in not 
looking things straight in the face, minimizing them. To understand 
presence in an action, it is important not to separate activity and 
passivity. And we once again find the multiteity chart with the 
cognitive economy, docility, fluidity and distraction mentioned above. 
I would also add forms of lessening of “logics of action”, making it 
so that actions said to be rational, communicational, practical, 
constraining (and others) do not really and completely have these 
qualities. Thus, a presence is more or less marked by this or that action 
logic and by forms of lessening. These are found: in implicitness or 
relegation to the background, where one stores, for example, the 
“social”, reasons for acting (Weber) and constraints (Durkheim); in 
fragmentation, that of the “social”, which does not manifest itself 
entirely or all at once; in what is unfelt or unperceived in the social; in 
the infiltration of remainders, such that an interaction logic is never 
exclusive; and in the flaws in communication logic (for example, the 
limitation of rays). Let us call all of this lessereity: a backdrop with 
beings and objects peripheral to the principal action; distracting objects 
and beings perceived in the state of a detail; the unconscious part of the 
individual performing the action; wandering thoughts infiltrating the 
mind; a wavering attitude; hypolucidity in the face of what exists and 
what is happening; implicitness, fragmentation and incompleteness. 
This is analogous to the “reversibility” Hannah Arendt spoke of about 
forgiveness as a limitation on the principle of action consequences in 
The Human Condition. It would instead be a diffuse, provisional 
reversibility interfering with aspects of responsibility, coherence or 
motivation, and always enabling words or acts to be deferred, displaced, 
postponed, unclosed. It is a way of “unbinding oneself”, not thinking of 
the possible burdens that could be brought by action consequences, 
which are sometimes indefinite, sometimes infinite. Negation, the “not 
really”, lies at the heart of human presence and action. I think it is 
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impossible to find humans without this “less”. It is like the very sign 
that there is a human in the situation or group, that there are 
individuals, that there are separate “each ones”. Because this is also 
what is meant by “the less”: that they are separate from one another, 
from the situation, that they are also turned in upon themselves, that 
they become withdrawn within themselves, in different ways.  
In the objective of the anthropological science, it can be useful to 
list and define the different forms of lessereity: 
 
! Absence-presence. This designates a way of being present in a 
situation, while being elsewhere in a lesser way, through 
thoughts, looks or gestures, distracted by external things. One can 
distinguish occasional distraction, stimulated by contingent 
things, the borderline-distraction by which an individual presents 
himself in a situation as if he were still in previous situations or in 
other situations that will follow, or even the detachment that 
keeps us from really being into the situation, with an air of 
absence, a blank look in the eye. It is often these particularities 
that are designated by the idea of the minor mode. 
 
! Buffer. This characterizes an action facilitated by the backdrop, 
which is made up of a set of objects and people, as well as other 
entities like animals or gods that are in a situation directly, or 
through various traces. They form a presence, which is not that of 
the reference points or clues informing an action and certain 
gestures. They are there, peripheral to the main action, almost 
gratuitously, without making demands, constituting a kind of 
buffer between the act performed with the required attention and 
the situation. 
  
! Incompletion. This can be found in acts and especially words that 
are not taken all the way in terms of their completion, their scope, 
their intrinsic nature. They stop, as if doing a U-turn, not 
completing, sometimes postponing. They do not conclude, they 
are not brought to a close. It is as if there were a pawl activating a 
reverse march, in any case a halt before the act or words continue. 
 
! Hesitation. Whereas incompletion designates an action that is not 
followed through, hesitation concerns an act or statement that 
hardly begins. There is a beginning, a hesitation, a kind of 
stammering. As if doubt had infiltrated at the beginning of 
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the execution. As if the thought were having some trouble being 
expressed, or dared not be expressed, dwindling in its attempt at 
expression. The one who acts withdraws into himself, through his 
hesitant words or also through an excess of sometimes clumsy 
gestures without direct meaning. 
 
! Repetition. The repetition of words or gestures, and their 
amplification at the same time, creates a kind of rhetoric enabling 
meanings and information to be set aside, as if the signifiers were 
more important and suspended a possible challenge. It creates a 
gap between the possible force of what is happening, of what is to 
be said, and the rhetoric that surrounds it and thus shifts the 
relevance of the message or act. 
 
! Suspension/interruption. This arises when the action or statement, 
once completed, remains without consequences, does not have the 
effect that its contents or meaning would imply, as if a cut-off 
were created beyond a situation, as if, carried away by the fluidity 
of succeeding moments, what is said or done remained isolated at 
the moment of its execution, without any link to the acts that 
follow and continue. 
 
! Fluidity. This indicates everyone’s ability to continue from one 
situation to another, to switch from one action to another, 
including between situations regulated by different, even 
contradictory principles. This implies, from moment to moment, 
withdrawing almost naturally, even just a little, from what is 
happening, from one’s role, and this without any critical intention. 
Not really being, independently of infiltrations by other things: 
the presence is thus immediately held back, de-intensified. This 
self-control of the human facilitates the movement between 
situations. It also enables a kind of diffuse tolerance of what is out 
of harmony within a situation.  
 
! Play. In this case, humans introduce an explicit distance into their 
role, into the action they are performing, as if they did not want 
their identity to coincide with the gesture or statement. Like a 
child who pretends to be a cowboy, everyone can take a more or 
less pronounced distance of dis-identity in relation to the expected 
role. It is in this distance that we find humor, irony, certain forms 
of duplicity and sometimes an excess that itself indicates a 
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distance. These forms of performance are numerous throughout 
the various moments of the day.  
 
! Hypolucidity. This is the term that I have used to designate the 
human way of being in a state of non-consciousness, or at least 
keeping below the minimal level of lucidity, a way of shutting 
one’s eyes and not seeing, not knowing, not wanting to know, 
being indifferent, not examining the challenges and consequences 
of what is happening. Lucidity, knowledge, consciousness and 
sensitivity are as if prevented from being sharpened and focusing 
on a thing, an element, an event. 
 
! Implicitation. This consists in making things implicit, placing them 
in the background. They are still there, hinted at, holding, 
solidifying, structuring the action in progress in a way that is not 
made explicit, but they are capable of springing up if a problem 
arises. Usually rules, codes, constraints, reasons for acting are in 
an implicit state, but are nevertheless operational.  
 
! Oblivion. Time, with its succession of instants, moments and 
situations is an ineluctable fact that one cannot escape. It is almost 
natural the way time generates oblivion, causing one to forget 
things—those which would not have been forgotten immediately 
–, the way it attenuates impacts—those of emotions that would 
not have been quickly tempered.  
 
! Habit. This is another effect of time, turning concentrations of 
first times into routines, automatic gestures that do not require 
attention, mastery or vigilance, that allow one not to think, not to 
verify everything, to trust and rely on the situation’s various 
supports, to thus create a flexible rhythm in the succession of 
actions and thoughts.  
 
! Docility. This indicates acceptance of what is found or what 
happens in a situation, without there being any desire for change. 
Docility is associated with parsimonious use of energy, with a 
minimal perception of things, also with a routinized, implicit use 
of various rules, reference points and signs, which can facilitate a 
withdrawal of attention. 
 
We see how lessereity not only concerns the distracted attention 
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and absence-presence of humans. It expresses the particularity and 
singularity of each one of them, irreducible to the collective, shared 
concern of the situation. But it also expresses incompletion and 
withdrawal consubstantial with the separation of bodies: a form of 
renouncement (one renounces because one knows one cannot get to the 
end of the space that separates), a form of distance (in relation to the 
others, who do not really listen to one, or in order to protect oneself 
from absorption), a form of indifference (to the failure of the incomplete 
link, in order to soften it). I think that it is impossible to thoroughly 
detail these “lesses” if one looks at a whole, a group, an interaction. 
These remarks suggesting a strong demand for description imply 
a critical point of view with regard to certain anthropologies. I am 
thinking, among others, of those of Tim Ingold (specifically his work of 
the past few years) and also of Michael Jackson (for instance, 2016). 
They are very characteristic of an oscillatory thought and writing. I do 
not believe that thought and writing which insist on oscillations 
between polarities and dichotomies, for example between individual and 
society, subjective and objective, singular and plural (or others), can 
express the complexity of a volume. Not only because the poles of a 
single opposition do not necessarily have the same ontological status, 
but also, by claiming, through these oscillatory plays, to show a kind of 
empathetic respect for encountered experiences and for various forms of 
relation, one no longer says much about units. I therefore prefer 
additive writing and thought that, beginning with one pole—the human 
volume—consists in adding, qualifying and modalizing, with an infinite 




Several years ago, I attributed the term “phenomenography” to the 
empirical approach that aims to observe and describe individual 
humans, because I saw “ethnography” as designating the search for the 
“shared” or the “inter”, of people themselves but also of the observer 
with them. The meaning I give to “phenomenography” is twofold: it is a 
written description of an existence as it appears, and a written 
description of an existence as it is lived, a “graphic inscription of 
phenomena”, to use the words of Robert Desjarlais (2015: 199), which 
can be possible with filmed or photographed images, but also with the 
precision of detailed writing. And this can be done without necessarily 
emphasizing the intersubjective component of the research, as this is 
often denoted in anthropology. On the one hand, it is an observation in 
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the strict sense, but focused on one individual (at a time) in his 
succession of moments, ideally in the context of a preliminary analysis, 
with the goal of exhausting reality (even if this is of course impossible). 
On the other hand, since a human volume is not an atom or a stone, the 
observation should be supplemented by in-depth analyzes of moments, 
with a view to describing the states of mind, the feelings, the moods, the 
desires that predispose to certain actions, the thoughts and also the 
peripheral mental images. In this way, the external observation is 
supplemented by the individuals’ own detailed description of their 
action. The researcher can use the method of explicitation (Vermersch, 
1999). It assumes that the person can access a “concrete memory”, not 
as a result of a conscious, considered effort, but almost involuntarily so 
that they can then describe actions, gestures and perceptions—those 
directly relevant to the situation as well as other subsidiary perceptions. 
It is up to the phenomenographer to solicit this description, to ask 
questions and trigger memories, for example through photo or film 
images, which constitute an exceptional resource that helps make 
people aware that they were not aware. Of course, no account is 
complete, but the aim is to learn “things” about how individuals are 
present and absent when they are with others. 
The anthropologist watches, dissecting voluntary rays and 
involuntary signs that are hardly perceived, inner states, feelings. One 
speaks of “being analyzed, being in analysis” to describe the work of 
psychoanalysis. One could speak of “being anthropologized” in reference 
to anthropologists of existence, who could be asked to conduct an 
anthropo-analysis. The anthropologist wants to lose as little as possible 
of his observation subject’s singularity, and is prepared to test all 
possible methodologies. Furthermore, writing and describing each 
subject’s details satisfies an ethical requirement, that of an ethics of 
volume:  it expresses itself in how one sees, in how one take notes and 
writes, in the details. This requires learning forms of detachment and 
withdrawal. It is also at this price—that there should be note-takers—




i. The paper was translated by Matthew Cunningham. 
 
ii. Professor of anthropology, University of Paris Nanterre, Researcher at the 
Centre for Ethnology and Comparative Sociology (CNRS). 
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